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Objectives
To determine the risk of COVID-19 transmission during minimally invasive surgical (MIS) procedures
Methods
Surgical society statements regarding the risk of COVID transmission during MIS procedures were reviewed. In addition,
the available literature on COVID-19 and other viral transmission in CO2 pneumoperitoneum, as well as the presence of
virus in the plume created by electrocautery during MIS was reviewed. The society recommendations were compared to the
available literature on the topic to create our review and recommendations to mitigate COVID-19 transmission.
Results
The recommendations promulgated by various surgical societies evolved over time as more information became available on
COVID-19 transmission. Review of the available literature on the presence of COVID-19 in CO2 pneumoperitoneum was
inconclusive. There is no clear evidence of the presence of COVID-19 in plume created by electrocautery. Technologies to
reduce CO2 pneumoperitoneum release into the operating room as well as filter viral particles are available and should
reduce the exposure risk to operating room personnel.
Conclusion
There is no clear evidence of COVID-19 virus in the CO2 used during MIS procedures or in the plume created by
electrocautery. Until the presence or absence of COVID-19 viral particles has been clearly established, measures to mitigate
CO2 and surgical cautery plume release into the operating room should be performed. Further study on the presence of
COVID-19 in MIS pneumoperitoneum and cautery plume is needed.
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Introduction
Surgical governing bodies, such as the Society of American
Gastrointestinal and Endoscopic Surgeons (SAGES) and the
Royal College of Surgeons (RCS), have recently made
statements regarding the possibility of COVID-19 release into
CO2 during minimally invasive surgery (MIS) and the
potential risk to the patient and healthcare team [1,2]. This
release of CO2 is one of many potential aerosol-generating
procedures that occur in the operating room. The basis for
this concern is evidence in the literature of virus release
during laparoscopic surgery. The recommendations by these
organizations have erred on the side of caution, given the
lack of understanding of how COVID-19 compares with
other viruses with regard to transmission and presence in
CO2 during MIS. The statements by these groups have
created uncertainty and confusion regarding the safety of
performing MIS during the COVID-19 pandemic, and
surgeons and other healthcare workers are requesting clarity
on the topic.
Society Statements on COVID-19 and
Minimally Invasive Surgery
Several surgical societies have addressed the potential risk of
COVID-19 transmission during MIS, most notably, the
SAGES and the RCS. The statements formulated by these
groups focus on the CO2 insufflation that is established
during MIS procedures such as laparoscopic, video-assisted
thoracoscopic and robotic surgery. The concern raised is that
CO2 could theoretically contain COVID-19 particles and that
aerosolization could expose healthcare workers to infectious
virus if there is unrestricted release of CO2 into the operating
room. Coupled with the fact that CO2 is under pressure
during MIS procedures, the potential theoretically exists for
viral exposure to healthcare workers in proximity to the
surgical field.
The basis for the society statements are prior published
reports of viral particles contained within CO2 aerosol as well
as surgical plume created by laser vaporization procedures
and electrocautery. One of the studies referenced by the
society’s statements concerned patients with hepatitis B
undergoing MIS procedures, where viral RNA was detected in
10 of 11 patients when surgical smoke was tested [3].
Another study evaluating laser vaporization found positive
cultures for bacteria (Coryne bacterium) from the laser plume,
but no virus was detected by culture [4]. There are also case
reports that mention exposed surgeons infected with human
papilloma virus (HPV) in patients undergoing laser ablation
of HPV tumours [5]. Based on both these reports on other
viruses and limited knowledge of COVID-19 in tissue and
blood, the surgical societies raised concerns about the
potential for COVID-19 in CO2 aerosol created during MIS
procedures. The connection to COVID-19 from previous
studies represents an extrapolation, however, and societies do
acknowledge that ‘there is no current data demonstrating an
aerosol presence of the COVID-19 virus released during
abdominal surgery. The data referenced was on the detection
of other viruses in surgical smoke’ [6].
One study that has gained attention and was referenced in
the Society statements was recently fast-track-published in
Annals of Surgery [7]. This is a report by surgeons from
China and Italy on their perspectives on surgical care during
the COVID-19 crisis. This is essentially an opinion paper of
what the authors feel constitutes safe surgical practice in a
time of overwhelming patient demand and limited resources.
Many of their recommendations are well-meaning and based
on common sense; however, the concerns raised about
COVID-19 in CO2 during MIS procedures and the risk to
healthcare workers are not based on evidence. The authors
state ‘the risk (aerosol exposure) is definitely higher in
laparoscopic than in traditional open surgery.’ This statement
on risk is based on the assumption that COVID-19 is present
in CO2, and to date, that has not been established. The
information presented in their report is best characterized as
expert opinion (Level 5 evidence).
Based on the limited evidence from previous studies focusing
on virus in CO2 and the rapidly changing scientific
environment, the initial statements from societies such as the
SAGES and the RCS have evolved. The SAGES has provided
four updates of its statement to date and the most recent
version includes, ‘There is very little evidence regarding the
relative risks of Minimally Invasive Surgery (MIS) versus the
conventional open approach, specific to COVID-19’ [1]. The
RCS’s initial report stated, ‘Laparoscopy should generally not
be used as it risks aerosol formation and infection. Chinese
and Italian experience reflects this’ (referencing the Annals of
Surgery report). Two days later the RCS revised their position,
‘Laparoscopy is considered to carry some risks of aerosol-type
formation and infection and considerable caution is advised.
The level of risk has not been clearly defined. . .’ [2].
A statement presented by the American Association of
Gynaecologic Laparoscopists (AAGL) regarding MIS during
COVID-19 represents a combined statement of six societies
dedicated to gynaecological surgery [8]. The AAGL statement
recognizes the limitations of the available literature on the
presence of COVID-19 in CO2 and states, ‘There is no
available evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic, or from
prior global influenza epidemics, to suggest definitively that
respiratory viruses are transmitted through an abdominal
route from patients to health care providers in the operating
room.’
Most recently, the European Association of Urology
Section released guidelines specific to urological procedures,
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further supporting the need for maximal protection of
healthcare professionals, minimizing aerosol dispersal during
laparoscopic procedures, and prioritizing urgent urological
procedures while postponing those at lower risk [9].
Key Points from Society Statements and
Published Literature
• There is no current evidence to demonstrate COVID-19 in
the CO2 plume created during MIS.
• There is no clear evidence that active virus is in the blood
stream in COVID-19-infected patients [10]. In the same
report, COVID-19 RNA was found in faeces, but there was
no viable virus.
• There remains uncertainty regarding the presence of active
COVID-19 outside of the respiratory tract.
• Viral exposure and transmission have been documented in
limited previous studies in laparoscopy and laser
procedures.
• The concerns regarding COVID-19 and MIS made by
surgical societies such as the SAGES and the RCS are
cautionary and based on a low level of evidence. These
recommendations have evolved and now acknowledge the
lack of supporting evidence. The authors are unaware of
any reports of COVID-19-related fatality of healthcare
workers directly attributed to MIS.
• The concerns put forward by statements from the SAGES
and the RCS may discourage surgeons from performing
MIS surgery without adequate evidence.
• The alternative to MIS, open surgery, is not without viral
transmission risk to the healthcare team and increases the
burden on the healthcare system by increasing hospital bed
occupancy with a longer length of stay.
• MIS is superior to open surgery with regard to several
patient outcomes across many disease states and conversion
to open surgery represents a deviation from standard of
care.
• Because of the uncertainty surrounding COVID-19 in the
CO2 plume, measures to decrease viral exposure to the
surgical team should be performed.
Mitigating COVD-19 Exposure During
Minimally Invasive Surgery
Despite the limited number of evidence-based studies
addressing the aerosolization of viral particles, there remains
concern for the potential presence of COVID-19 in CO2
during MIS. Van Doremalen et al. [11] have provided direct
in vitro evidence that SARS-Cov-2 is similar to SARS-Cov-1
in that there is plausible transmission of the virus via aerosol
or fomite routes. The study demonstrates that COVID-19 can
remain viable and infectious for hours in aerosolized
materials and for days on surfaces. Efforts should therefore be
made to limit cautery plume creation during MIS and CO2
release into the operating room. These efforts to reduce
aerosolization and exposure of surgical personnel have been
taken from Society recommendations and include the
measures outlined below.
Patient Testing
It has been recommended that patients undergoing surgery be
tested for COVID-19 prior to the procedure. Patients with
symptoms consistent with COVID-19 should undergo testing
prior to surgery if the clinical situation allows for delay. With
accumulating data on patients undergoing surgery in the
setting of active COVID-19 infection, it is now more
important than ever to clarify the COVID-19 status of
patients undergoing any procedure. Lei et al. [12] recently
reported on 34 patients undergoing elective surgery in the
setting of positive testing. Alarmingly, 44% of these surgical
patients required ICU care following surgery and seven
patients died after ICU admission. Although this small case
series should be taken seriously, the true effect of COVID-19
in the postoperative period remains unknown as it is unclear
how many patients underwent elective surgery in the study
who were potentially COVID-19 positive while being
asymptomatic.
Because of the relatively long incubation period of COVID-19
(3–14 days) [13], and the now recognized cohort of virus-
positive asymptomatic patients in the community setting, we
recommend that all patients be tested prior to surgery as
permitted by the availability of testing supplies by the
institution. Real-time PCR assays detecting viral RNA have
been the mainstay of testing in the USA thus far. These tests
have demonstrated efficacious, though variable results with
regards to sensitivity and false-negative rates [14]. PCR assay
performance may also rely on sample type, skill of collection,
and varying stages of infection in the patient [15]. Given this
information, we recommend the most comprehensive testing
techniques available.
As of 1 April 2020, the US Food and Drug Administration
has emergently approved new rapid testing based on IgM and
IgG antibodies in the blood and serum (qSARS-CoV-2 IgG/
IgM Rapid Test; Cellex Inc. Research Triangle Park, North
Carolina USA) [16]. This rapid test takes 15–20 min to
provide results and has been approved as an adjunct to PCR
testing at this time with a 93.8% sensitivity. Although recent
data support that serological conversion of COVID-19 can
take >7 days for IgM and >10 days for IgG from the onset of
symptoms [14], this rapid test may prove beneficial in the
surgical setting for several reasons: (1) it may increase the
sensitivity and capture of positive patients; (2) it may
determine asymptomatic carriers; and (3) it could be an
option where RT-PCR is not available and delay in surgery is
not appropriate.
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Although this test could theoretically test for immunity (IgG-
positive, IgM-negative), given the unclear period of viral
shedding, we should not declare an IgG-only-positive patient
as non-infectious. Dual testing, with both RT-PCR and IgM/
IgG antibodies, may be useful for all patients undergoing
elective surgical procedures in order to amplify the sensitivity
of detecting positive patients, although there is not worldwide
approval for antibody testing at this time.
Imaging studies, such as chest CT, have also been used as a
potential rapid and reliable testing platform for COVID-19.
Ai et al. [17] demonstrated a 97% sensitivity when used in
COVID-19-positive patients based on RT-PCR testing.
Although CT chest imaging may be sensitive for detecting
COVID-19, it lacks specificity. Furthermore, CT
manifestations of COVID-19 tend to occur later in the
disease process and may miss patients with earlier sequelae of
the virus [18]. At this time, we do not recommend
widespread utilization of CT imaging as a diagnostic tool
prior to elective surgery.
If a patient were to test positive, the AAGL statement
recommends delaying surgery until the patient has recovered
from COVID-19 if it does not put the patient at risk. If a patient
were to test negative, with or without symptoms, consideration
for a false-negative test should be made and patients treated as
‘positive until proven otherwise’. Therefore, patients without
COVID-19 testing and those testing negative should be treated
as potentially positive and further steps to mitigate exposure
should be performed during the surgical procedure.
Personal Protection
All operating room personnel involved with MIS procedures
should ideally be provided with personal protective
equipment (PPE) to include N-95 masks or controlled air-
purifying respirators (CAPRs), given the unknown risk of
virus in the CO2 plume. Some studies suggest that standard
surgical masks provide protection on a par with N-95 masks
[19]. In a randomized study involving over 2300 healthcare
workers comparing those who wore N-95 masks with those
with standard medical masks, there was no difference in
influenza acute respiratory illness or infections between the
two groups. This experience is potentially transferrable to
COVID-19 as the size of influenza type A is between 80 and
120 nm (0.08–0.12 µm) [20] and COVID-19 is recognized to
be between 60 and 140 nm (0.06–0.14 µm). In addition to
masks, full PPE to include shoe covers, impermeable gowns,
protective head covering, gloves and eye protection should be
used by all members the operating team.
Operating Room Management
The minimum number of healthcare workers should be in
the operating room during MIS procedures, and only
essential personnel should be present to limit traffic and
exposure. Breaks in and out of the room should be limited to
decrease personnel exposure and limit the amount of
necessary PPE. Because of potential limitations in
communication while wearing full PPE, conversations in the
operating room should be limited to essential surgical-related
topics. Surgical training should be altered to decrease
exposure to non-essential personnel, reduce operating times,
and conserve limited PPE resources.
Anaesthetic Concerns
Both intubation and extubation of the patient are powerful
aerosol-generating procedures and pose a high risk to
operating room personnel. Potential aerosol-generating
procedures in the operating room, aside from surgical smoke,
include tracheal intubation, manual ventilation,
cardiopulmonary resuscitation and suctioning [21]. The
American Society of Anaesthesiologists has put forward
recommendations in the setting of COVID-19, including
limiting fibre-optic intubation and considering rapid sequence
intubation in order to avoid manual ventilation [22].
Although negative-pressure operating rooms have been
recommended to reduce potential viral contamination [23],
these are not readily available at many institutions. Therefore,
only core anaesthetic staff should be present during
intubation and extubation. According to the Association for
Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology ‘the
established standard for operating rooms requires 20 air
changes per hour’ [24]. With this information, along with the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines on
time required for airborne contaminant removal [25], a
minimum of 20 min should be observed prior to entering the
operating room after intubation.
Surgical Technique
To decrease the risk of virus release into the CO2 plume,
steps can be taken to improve tissue dissection and division.
These include reducing the electrocautery settings, decreasing
application time, and improving tissue moisture to reduce
tissue charring and smoke formation. Recommendations state
to use the lowest setting possible and to avoid techniques that
create unnecessary plume in the abdomen. Ultrasonic devices,
such as the harmonic scalpel, create significant aerosol
without desiccation of tissue, and potentially viral release, and
should be used judiciously. It is important to recognize that
open surgical procedures can generate plume with similar
devices.
The uncontrolled release of CO2 from the abdomen should
also be avoided. Steps include decreasing the insufflation
pressure to the lowest level possible that still permits good
visualization. This will decrease the amount of CO2 under
pressure and reduce inadvertent release. Ports should be
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placed with the intent of reducing leakage around the ports
and port valves should be functional or replaced. Tissue
extraction should be performed after elimination of the CO2
pressure and controlled evacuation of the CO2 plume. Open
incisions where CO2 can readily escape, such as an open
vaginal cuff, should be planned for in advance and steps
taken to reduce CO2 leakage. Finally, if a laparoscopic suction
device is being used, this would ideally be connected to a
filtered device with an ultra-low particulate air (ULPA) or
high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter and not to an in-
room canister connected to wall suction.
CO2 Plume Management
There is no way to completely prevent CO2 escape during an
MIS procedure as the ports ‘closed’ with a valve will leak with
instrument insertion; however, there are technologies available
to filter the CO2 and plume created during MIS procedures.
This would reduce the amount of potential untreated aerosol
released into the operating room.
COVID-19 particles are estimated to be between 0.06 and
0.14 µm (60–140 nm; Table 1). To reduce virus in CO2
aerosol, the filtration system should ideally be smaller than
the diameter of the virus. There are several filtration systems
available to address surgical plume and eliminate virus as well
as other products created during plume formation [26], but
these options may vary depending on hospital location and
local industry partners (Table 2).
A technology currently available for MIS is the Airseal
insufflation/smoke evacuation system by Conmed, Utica, New
York and Surgiquest UK (Lawmed, Walton on Thames, UK).
Airseal mode is a high-flow insufflation system with concurrent
smoke evacuation in a low (3 L/min) and high evacuation
mode (8 L/min). The Airseal mode uses a valveless port with a
virtual valve created by an airflow ‘shield’ (Fig. 1). The Airseal
mode provides smoke evacuation through a 0.01-µm filter
which is smaller than the recognized diameter of COVID-19.
This technology allows pressure release, which is beneficial
during increases in pressure during the procedure (patient
bucking), however, it allows CO2 escape due to the open-port
configuration and is not ideal when there is concern for
plume-containing virus. The Society statements have
recommended a ‘closed’ insufflation system to reduce CO2
leakage, distinct from the Airseal mode which is ‘open’.
Perhaps unknown to some surgeons, the same Airseal
insufflation box offers another mode known as the smoke
evacuation mode (SEM), which is a closed circulation of CO2
with the CO2 filtered through a 0.01-µmULPA filter (Fig. 2).
This allows filtration at a smaller particle size than the recognized
diameter of COVID-19. The SEM uses standard laparoscopic
ports with one line of the dual lumen tube as the CO2 ‘in’ side
and the other end of the tube as the ‘out’, which passes through
the ULPA filter (Fig. 3). The SEM is a closed system and
provides CO2 flow at standard inflow rates (20 or 40 L/min).
Another option is the PneumoClear device made by Stryker-
Kalamazoo, MI, USA (Fig. 4). This is a closed circulating
insufflation system, with CO2 passed through a 0.08-µm
ULPA filter. This system also offers a ‘desufflation’ mode,
which removes the CO2 contents and passes them through
the ULPA filter. The PneumoClear device requires the
updated version of the Stryker insufflator.
There are also inline filters available to remove small particles
from CO2 aerosol and these options do not require additional
insufflators or tube sets. The Plume Port Active (Buffalo
Filter) is made by Conmed (Fig. 5) and the Pureview filter is
made by Stryker (Fig. 6). Both are inline filters that are
connected to the side port of laparoscopic port and then to
suction tubing. The amount of suction will need to be
regulated to keep up with CO2 inflow to maintain working
space and visibility. Both filters contain a 0.1-µm filter, which
is larger than reported COVID-19 particles.
Another source of CO2 aerosol that may impact surgical staff
is the laparoscopic suction device used by the surgeon during
laparoscopic and video-assisted thoracoscopic surgery
procedures and the bedside assistant during robotic surgery.
This suction device is usually connected to a suction canister
connected to wall suction and goes unfiltered. A substantial
volume of CO2 is removed with this device and this should
ideally be filtered. Most laparoscopic suction devices have a
Table 1 Size comparison of virus particles.
Acronym Name Size, µm
HAV Hepatitis A virus 0.02
HEV Hepatitis E virus 0.03
HBV Hepatitis B virus 0.04
HPV Human papilloma virus 0.05
HCV Hepatitis C virus 0.06
COVID-19 Novel coronavirus 0.06–0.14
HIV Human immunodeficiency virus 0.12
BAC Bacteria 0.30
Table 2 Comparison of CO2 filtration systems.
CO2 filtration system Mode Micron filter*
Airseal SEM (Conmed) Insufflation/ smoke evacuation ULPA
0.01
Plume port active (Conmed) Inline filter ULPA
0.1
Pneumoclear (Stryker) Insufflation/smoke evacuation ULPA
0.08
Pureview (Stryker) Inline filter ULPA
0.1
Neptune 3 (Stryker) Inline filter HEPA 0.3
ULPA 0.1
HEPA, high-efficiency particulate air; SEM, smoke evacuation mode; ULPA, ultra-low
particulate air. *HEPA filters at 0.3 µm @ 99.95%; ULPA filters at 0.12 µm @
99.99%.
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standard suction connection, and filtration options for this
type of connection are limited.
One option to address CO2 plume from the suction device
is to connect the suction tubing to a Neptune Waste
Management System (Stryker; Fig. 7). The Neptune possesses
both an ULPA filter on the side of the unit (Fig. 8) and a
HEPA filter on the front of the device. The front ports
readily accept standard suction tubing from a laparoscopic
suction device. The side filter containing the ULPA filter







Fig. 1 Airseal insufflation port. The valveless port permits CO2 escape during increases in intra-abdominal pressure.
Smoke Evacuation Mode
Bifurcated, Dual-Lumen Filtered Tube Set
Provides high flow insufflation•
•
•
Facilitates smoke evacuation and
filtration with 0.01μ ULPA filter





Fig. 2 AirSeal smoke evacuation mode (Conmed). ULPA, ultra-low particulate air.
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specifications for the ULPA and HEPA filters on the
Neptune 3 device are 0.1 and 0.3 µm, respectively. It is
important to note that because of associated fluid and blood
in the suction irrigation device, the laparoscopic suction
device should only be connected to the front manifold
connections of the Neptune 3. The front manifold contains
the HEPA filter and is connected to 4- and 20-L canisters,
which are designed for fluid collection. The laparoscopic
suction should not be connected to the ULPA manifold,
which does not have collection capability and should be
used for CO2 aerosol filtration only. There are also options
for controlling the force of suction located on the back of
the Neptune device and this may need to be adjusted
depending on the impact of suction on maintaining
adequate vision during the MIS procedure.
Recommendations
Based on the available evidence, review of the literature and
practical considerations, the authors have drawn up some
recommendations, which are set out below.
Indication for Surgery
• MIS procedures should be limited to planned urgent or
emergency procedures.
Testing
• There should be preoperative testing of surgical patients
prior to MIS procedures if feasible.
• Avoid surgery in COVID-19 positive patients and allow
recovery or intervene after viral shedding is complete, if
clinical course permits
• If patients are not tested, or test negative, they should be
managed as positive because of uncertainty around
testing.
Operating Room Management
• Limit healthcare workers in the operating room to essential
personal.
Fig. 3 Smoke evacuation port set-up. CO2 is insufflated through one port and evacuated through a second port.
Fig. 4 Pneumoclear smoke evacuation system (Stryker).
Fig. 5 Plume port active (Buffalo Filter; Conmed).
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• Limit through traffic and breaks to reduce the number of
staff in the room.
• Surgical training should be avoided to reduce exposure and
operating time.
Protecting Operating Room Staff
• PPE, including N-95 masks, should be made available to
healthcare workers in the operating room, especially those
at the bedside during MIS procedures.
• Staff should remain remote from the surgical field if their
job allows.
Optimizing Surgical Technique
• Efforts should be made to reduce surgical plume creation
by reducing electrocautery settings, application time, and
tissue desiccation.
Fig. 6 Pureview inline filter (Stryker).
Fig. 7 Neptune 3 waste management system (Stryker). Fig. 8 Stryker neptune ultra-low particulate air filter access.
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• CO2 working pressure should be reduced to the lowest
acceptable level to allow a safe operating space and
maintain visibility.
• Uncontrolled release of CO2 from the abdomen should be
avoided during instrument placement, tissue extraction, or
release of CO2 at the end of the case. Efforts should be
made to suction the residual CO2 from the patient into a
filtration system.
Filtration of CO2 Plume
• Efforts should be made to use a closed insufflation system
to reduce escape of CO2 into the operating room
environment.
• CO2 from the working space should be filtered through a
closed filtration system using the smallest filter available.
• CO2 from the suction devices should also be filtered
through a filtration system using the smallest filter
available.
Summary
Concern has been raised regarding the risk of exposure to
healthcare workers in the operating room from CO2 created
during MIS procedures in patients potentially harbouring
COVID-19. The risk remains unclear at this time based on
the lack of definitive data demonstrating active COVID-19
virus present in CO2 aerosol. Despite this uncertainty, efforts
to protect operating room staff should be implemented to
decrease exposure to surgical smoke created during MIS
procedures. These efforts include preoperative testing in all
patients scheduled for MIS surgery, comprehensive PPE for
staff, and reducing the production of surgical plume and
filtration of CO2 through approved filters. Although there
remains no definitive evidence of COVID-19 transmission
during open or minimally invasive abdominal surgery, these
recommendations serve as an expert opinion, putting forth
maximal precautions in the management of an unknown
threat. Converting MIS procedures to open surgical
procedures without clear justification may put another burden
on our already stressed healthcare system.
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